On June 28, 2014, at the main mosque in Mosul and during Friday prayers, Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, proclaimed the return of the Caliphate, culminating an eleven-year process
since Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group's creator, settled in Iraq in 2003 with the
objective of responding to American troops.
The Islamic State thus crystallized ancient desires shown for decades by
prominent Salafist jihadist ideologues such as the current leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri
who in his work “Knights under the banner of the Prophet” had already mentioned that it was
necessary to appropriate a portion of the Middle East to begin rebuilding from it
the Caliphatoi.
In 2014, the Islamic State not only controls a small portion of land in a steep
mountainous cross-border region of, for example, Afghanistan, but it controls a territory
extensive in two countries, Iraq and Syria, numerous cities such as Mosul, the second largest city
Iraqi, and what is more notable, has access to important economic resources such as
oil plants, money looted from banks like Mosul itself or taxes
collected in the cities under his government, all together with a wide recruitment of
combatants (local and foreign) or an extensive advertising and social media network.
This represented a new panorama in the pyramid of terrorist groups, while leaving behind
to his predecessor and until that moment the greatest exponent of international terrorism to
West, Al-Qaedaii.
When talking about the Islamic State, it is important to highlight the rapid acceleration of the path from the
insurgency towards control of territory and moderately stable government structuresiii or
the transformation from an insurgent group to a relevant transnational actor with the capacity to alter
the distribution of power in its own regional system and exporting insecurity to other areas
regionaliv.
Three years after its defeat, Iraq today remains a fragile and unstable countryv. The next
elections called for the month of June and recently postponed until Octobervi could
be an occasion to restore the faith of the Iraqi people, however, the protests of recent
months and attacks like the one last January in Baghdad that caused the death of at
least 32 people and more than a hundred injured, causes the injuries of the civilian population not
finish healing and at the same time incite a new rise of terrorist groups such as
Islamic State.
The situation in other parts of the world such as the Sahel is not much better. State
Islamic in the Great Sahara multiplies its attacks and seeks to benefit from the weaknesses of
countries like Niger, Mali or Burkina Fasovii.
For all this we understand that it is interesting with the vision of 2021 to go back to 2014 and
emphasize the errors committed by the Iraqi state, as well as the successes that the State
Islamic knew how to capitalize on its expansion until the proclamation of the caliphate.
How did you manage to go from insurgency to proto-state? What lessons can we draw from
after his defeat?
In our opinion, there are five key points that led to the rapid rise of the
self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq. INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATORY OF SECURITY, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM 3
Key points:
- Learn from mistakes and failed antecedents. Promote changes in
military and political strategy.
Until 2014, no terrorist group had been able to control a small territory and a population.
so extensive. There is extensive history of failures when it comes to declaring territorial control and
a government. Among the examples we find the case of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
in Yemen or Al-Shabab in Somalia.
One of the main mistakes made is not having the support of the population. In June
2010 Nasir al-Wuhaysi, the leader of AQAP, with a small group of fighters writes to
Osama bin-Laden informing him that he is prepared to conquer Sana'a, he replies
"We want to establish Sharia in Sana'a only if we are able to preserve it." Bin-Laden is
aware that the support of the population is required and continues to warn AQAP "to avoid killing
none of the tribes […] we must win the support of the tribes who enjoy the strength and
influence before the construction of a Muslim state […]» viii.
The constitution of what would become the Islamic State dates back to 2003 when Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi establishes a first clandestine network in the so-called Sunni triangle, which consists
from the cities of Baghdad, Ramadi and Tikritix. The group would go through different phases between those years
and 2014, with in some periods very little support and on the verge of disappearance,
especially during the period between 2007 and 2010 with the so-called «Sons
of Iraq" or "Awakening" when the tribes and Sunni population in general collaborated with the government
and American troops in the fight against the name of the Islamic State in that
era, Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
When we talk about civil conflicts, there are numerous circumstances that activate the
population tensions: motivations related to economic problems, division
ethnicity, political grievances, or as Collier and Hoefflerx point out
, the civil conflict understood as the
result of a calculation of profits, “greed and grievances” or greed and complaint, a structure
of opportunities that is suitable for the organization of rebellion or insurrection.
The collapse of authority and the increase in suspicions between actors who interpret the
reinforcement of security are eminent causes of civil conflicts, which usually
to show up in communities where political institutions are unable to restrain a
minority predisposed to violence after the collapse of central authority.
These problems were present in Iraq, but they had also been present in other countries.
previous conflicts without managing to obtain territorial control like the one that is going to be achieved in
2014.
An example of a change in military strategy is the one that occurred between December 2009 and
January 2010. The “Strategic Plan for Reinforcing the Political
Position of the ISI”, a document that analyzed the errors made previously and
It enacted a change in combat strategy to date. In this plan
recommended not attacking US troops, but rather the Iraqi army or the police, at the same time
while seeking to attack small units, forcing government troops to
abandon their bases in the regions where they are weakestxi.
The design of the strategy is not only military, but has a second political phase through
which will channel Sunni discontent. Generating the transformation of military control into
political or government control. - Discontent of a part of the population and sectarianism.
In a conflict, the support of the population is necessary, since without it the control of the territory is
makes it practically impossible to maintain, or at least it is necessary at first
instance until it can organize and develop coercive structures that allow it to
obtain control even with the population against.
As we have mentioned previously, when a civil conflict begins
we have to attend to the circumstances that may have caused disenchantment on the part
of the population, such as ethnic and/or religious hatred between groups, the level of political repression,
the political exclusion of groups or the economic inequality of the country, all of which
found in Iraq to a greater or lesser extent since 2006.
Broadly speaking, Iraq can be divided into three zones based on its population. Kurdish Northeast,
Shia south and Sunni northwest. When we look at the territory in which the Islamic State gained
further expansion (provinces of Nineveh, Amber, Saladin) we realize that
correspond to provinces with a Sunni majority, although in Iraq the majority of the population (especially
60%) is Shia. This makes us intuit that some different dynamic must exist in these
areas, unlike cities like Nasiriya, Diwaniya, Basra or Najaf (mostly
Shiites). These data make us think that the Islamic State knew how to deepen the differences and fissures
existing in the communities, increase them and take advantage of them in their favor, thus having a
some support or at least no opposition on the part of the population.
The long-term key for the Islamic State was also knowing how to provide levels of satisfaction
of governance to the Sunni population living under its control. Some services that the government
Iraqi did not know how to provide and that had not so much to do with material services but rather with
with a feeling of protection and listening to the rejection of the central government.
To these elements we must add others such as the control of areas with oil, water or
wheat that caused a balance between a government out of fear and a government achieving
sustainability.
In the 2003 war, it will be the Sunnis who oppose the fall of the regime and they were not
few Sunni leaders who supported the insurgency and the boycott of the US. Above all, after
dismantling of the state in which the Sunni population had been better regarded.
At the beginning of 2012, numerous suicide attacks were observed against Shiite cities such as
Karbala, Nasiriya or Basra, with the aim of increasing sectarian differences.
In February 2014 the insecurity situation has deteriorated and murders and kidnappings
are commonxii, with continued attacks being launched against Security Forces checkpoints
Iraqi security and Shiite groups.
With these actions, the differences between the population increase and the population
Sunni, afraid of reprisals and faced with the abandonment of the central government, see the Islamic State
as their protector, since, in circumstances of profound uncertainty, people
They turn to the group, militia or any identity that offers them a better change for the
own survivalxiii.
The role played by tribes is also notable. In late 2013 and early 2014, Ali
Hatem al Suleiman; emir of the Dulaim tribe and leader of the Anbar Tribes Revolutionary Council,
spokesman for the Sunni tribes in Iraq and one of the leaders who had the “Awkening”xiv calls INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATORY OF SECURITY, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM 5
tribes to arm themselves and protect their community, talking about "tribal revolution" against Maliki and
his governmentxv.
The establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq is presented as a state for the population
Iraqi Sunni that has seen its influence and capabilities diminished in favor of the rise of the
Shiite population after the American invasion - Dismantling of the State.
Going back to 2003, after the American emergence, we find a
breaking of the Iraqi state's monopoly on violence that has resulted in a
dispersion of state violence towards a competition of power blocsxvi. with the fall
of Saddam Hussein, a new panorama and a new opportunity structure were opened, such as
sectarian mobilization or the violence of insurgency, both consequences of a sick state
or failedxvii, as well as economic stagnation and deterioration of infrastructure that does not
It does nothing but enhance grievances at the moment they occur.
Thus, in a collapsed or collapsing state, opportunities arise for
insurgents, how to acquire economic benefits and then have the capacity to organize
and maintain the rebellionxviii.
After the emergence of the United States, three elements occur that break the state at the same time.
time that this must be created practically from scratch in a controversial transition of the
country. First of all, we find the debazification of the country, the massive exclusion of
members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party from the new power structures and who were
who until then had governed the country. Secondly, with the
dismantling of the armed forces that until then were dominated by loyalists
to the previous ones. Restructuring an army from practically scratch is not an easy task. And lastly
place a configuration of the political scheme defined in a sectarian key, with discontent and
feeling of marginalization of the Sunníxix population.
We must not forget that when Maliki assumed power in 2006 and when faced with a state
weak and ineffective, what it does is try to consolidate the military apparatus at the same time
centralizes power in his figure, because at that moment Iraq is a competition for power and
the resources. This control over resources, the Iraqi armed forces or the monopoly of the
State institutions will accelerate from this moment on. During 2011 and later
climate of the "Arab springs" some protest movements begin to emerge through
which the Sunni population demands more representation.
The networks of groups such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State develop in countries due to the
chronicity of failed state, autocratic rule and tribal conflicts. These networks
They present great strength in areas where the central authority is sick and strongly
resentful as was happening at that time in Iraq.
As we have previously pointed out, the greatest discontent will occur in the provinces of
Saladin, Nineveh, Diyala, and cities like Mosul or Kirkuk with numerous protests taking place. TO
Through them different groups will begin to take advantage, causing the population
Sunni began to look at insurgency and terrorismxx.
As an example in the 2014 elections, the Sunni population complains of rigging in the provinces
mentioned above where they are the majority population and do not get a majorityxxi. - Alliances between groups.
In their search for success, armed groups need to use certain alliances with others
groups. Normally, cooperation occurs between groups with similar objectives or ideologies, in
many times they face each other for popular support, especially when they represent the same
ethnic or religious group, although there are also cases of cooperation without having said
similarityxxii, simply using the maxim “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Through
From these alliances, terrorist groups achieve two objectives: on the one hand, facilitating the
transfer of resources and on the other hand increase the impact of attacks. Examples of both
We have cases at this moment, since we find groups of jihadist inspiration
Salafi, but also with groups and insurgency with a totally different ideology such as
for example the one that comes from the Baath Party.
Many Baath leaders joined the insurgency, among the classic names stands out Ibrahim al Douri, who died in October 2020. The one called the king of clubs by the forces
Americans and who was number two in Saddam's government and to whom is attributed a
important role in the execution of the strategies carried out together with the Islamic State. He
development of strategic and military actions suggests that without leaders with great
knowledge of the country or of said strategic capabilities and operation and direction of
networks closer to the army than to the insurgency, the expansion of the Islamic State would have been
more difficult.
Cooperation in the case of the Islamic State is not new, since since the installation of the group
Initially in Iraq in 2003, he began collaborating with different groups in the Kurdistan area
Iraqxxiii.
Every terrorist group needs to survive, apart from organizational effectiveness, tactics and
strategically strengthened through the mobilization of combatants, funds and supportxxiv.
In this search for personnel support we find that in July 2012 Abu Bakr al Bagdadi announces the “Breaking Walls” campaignxxv, one of the most successful operations in this
period. The campaign, focused on the attack on eight prisons and developed over a period of
year, demonstrates the growth, sophistication and organization of the group through the presence of
multiple cells and a plan established in several phasesxxvi at the same time that he managed to obtain
fighters willing to join the group.
Nor should we disdain the relationships that could have been produced through the
stay at Camp Bucca, where prisoners of different kinds would make friendships and alliances that
would be developed after the previous campaign. - Approach strategy to the civilian population.
We have previously spoken of the discontent of the population and the prevailing sectarianism, without
However, that does not mean that the Islamic State had the complete support of the population, or
of a part of it. I had to earn it.
We could have mentioned the political strategy in the first point, however, we
It seems important enough to highlight it in a separate point.
As Aaron Y. Zelinxxvii points out, the expansion of the Islamic State followed a clearly
defined in its expansion and consolidation of the territory.
Territorial control is divided into two stages: pre-control or partial control and total control of the
territory.
In the first stage the author has identified five phases:
- Intelligence Phase: in it the activation of cells is developed and launched
sleepers, both in cities and in the infiltration of other groups. It is necessary to learn
on the local terrain, identify who are the most notable actors, as well as future
enemies or opponents. Try to buy or attract local leaders, and later
begin to operate militarily in the area where they seek to gain influence. - Dawa Phase: It could be translated with proselytism. After the pre-control of the territory,
They would begin to carry out daily activities towards the population, especially the young. Talk
of Islam and jihad. This phase would be promoted in numerous areas such as markets or streets,
in meetings with clans, tribes or notables. It represents an increase in the narrative of the case. - Hisba Phase: After the launch of the message in the previous phase, it would be passed to control
ideological, to the establishment of the Koranic duty and prohibitions begin to be made such as
music or alcohol, at the same time that non-Sunni minorities would be subjected. - Government Phase: moment in which the population is regulated.
Finally, the establishment of total control: we can broadly point out that in this
point we find the non-existence of dissidence and the avoidance of awakening the population
against the ruling group. It is the moment in which you begin to fight with another army
conventional type (this has only been seen in Iraq and Syria), in which Sharia is established, or in
the management of public projects in order to make life easier for the population, such as roads,
schools, or services that were not being provided and in which the population observes that
they can govern.
Conclusion.
Islamic State, starting in 2010, knew how to take advantage of an opportunity to maximize its power by
through the instrumentalization of various circumstances.
First, learn from various circumstances that had not allowed them to gain control
territorial, both in previous conflicts and countries, and in Iraq itself since 2003.
Nouri al-Maliki's policies, especially after the withdrawal of US troops
in 2011 they failed to create an awareness of national unity among the Iraqi people, but instead
On the contrary, they were harmful or at least understood as grievances by a large
part of the country's population, in this case the Sunni. These policies exacerbated the distances
between both groups. The protests of the Sunni population were already very numerous in 2012. The
Iraqi state on the verge of collapse did not know how to respond, producing a situation of
greater ungovernability and which led to the Islamic State declaring itself as the sole defender
of the Sunni population in Iraq.
Islamic State potentiated chaos in the country, but above all the existing sectarianism among
communities. Which allowed him to gain the support of a population without which there would be no
achieved its expansion.
Cooperation between groups and changes in both military and political strategy also
produced results. Alliances and cooperation between similar insurgent groups or the process
of "Iraqization" of the leading commanders of the Islamic State based on cooperation with
former leaders of the Baath Party, has its echo in the complexity of the elements of the
both a military strategy, the case of the "Breaking Walls" campaign, and a political one that gave way
to the expansion and conquest of territory.
Undoubtedly the factors that played in the expansion of the Islamic State go beyond the
mentioned here. The importance of what was called “Arab Spring” of 2001, the
Syrian conflict, the role of neighboring states such as Türkiye or Iran, as well as regional countries
and international powers are elements that influenced and must be taken into account when
We talk about what the Islamic State meant mainly between 2014 and 2017 in Iraq.
However, the choice of these five keys seems important to us since they emanate
directly from Iraqi soil and can be repeated both in Iraq, where it does not seem that the
conflict has healed, as in other countries, mainly in the Sahel such as Mali, Niger or
Burkina Faso, where factions of both the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel and others of the same
nature, they could exploit these same keys to their benefit, mainly sectarianism and
support strategy for part of the population in areas where state action is limited
or practically non-existent.
Bibliographic notes.
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